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Recent Tenth Circuit decisions add little of significance to
the field of administrative law, but several merit some discussion.
It is clear from the increasing number of decisions concerning this
area' that administrative agencies provide important avenues of
relief to individuals who have no other accessible remedy;2 it is
also clear that the courts hesitate to substitute their discretion for
that of the expert agency.3
I. SCOPE AND EXTENT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
In Salone v. United States4 the Tenth Circuit denied de novo
review to federal employees appealing decisions of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission.' This result is consistent
with other decisions which limit review to the record where the
complainant is a federal employee.'
Other recent Tenth Circuit cases involved a review on the
There were 23 cases dealing with administrative law this year in the Tenth Circuit,
compared with 15 last year. The trend seems to be that increasing numbers of decisions
are being appealed; hence, it is concluded that more decisions are being made at the
administrative level also.
E.g., Bard v. Seamans, 507 F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1974). Note also that, where adminis-
trative agencies have been created, courts will frequently refuse relief to a complainant
until all administrative remedies have been exhausted.
, See United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956); St. Joseph
Stockyards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936).
; 511 F.2d 902 (10th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3684 (U.S. June 19,
1975) (No. 74-1600).
' The complaint in Salone was filed under the Equal Employment Opportunity Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5, -16 (1970). An administrative hearing, resulting in a detailed record,
preceded the judicial action.
' Hackley v. Johnson, 360 F. Supp. 1247 (D.D.C. 1973). See also Tomlin v. United
States Air Force Medical Center, 369 F. Supp. 353 (S.D. Ohio 1974). These cases rely on
the fact that claims brought under the civil service statutes limit review to the administra-
tive record. Since all federal employees may seek relief pursuant to these sections, these
courts would not provide a more extensive review where relief is sought under the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act. This reasoning may, however, defeat the broad public
policy objective evidenced in the Act. But see Henderson v. Defense Contract Admin.
Serv. Region, 370 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Thompson v. United States Dep't of
Justice, 360 F. Supp. 255 (N.D. Cal. 1973), rev'd, 372 F. Supp. 762 (N.D. Cal. 1974), in
light of Hackley v. Johnson, 360 F. Supp. 1247 (D.D.C. 1973). On the other hand, claim-
ants employed in private industry may have a trial de novo. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
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record where appellants claimed the administrative determina-
tion was not supported by substantial evidence.' The Tenth Cir-
cuit found for the agencies in these decisions, which included two
cases where the court examined the relationship between the de-
termination of the administrative law judge (ALJ) and that of the
agency.'
II. JURISDICTIONAL AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION ISSUES
The Tenth Circuit also based recent decisions on primary
jurisdiction, exhaustion of remedies, and res judicata. In
Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. Powell' the court, basing its reason-
ing on the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,'" deferred its decision
until the EEOC had completed administrative action.
In Bard v. Seamans" the appellate court applied the doctrine
of exhaustion of remedies 2 and refused relief because Bard had
failed to avail himself of the administrative machinery specifically
provided by Congress for the purpose of reviewing and correcting
military discharges. 3
Frohlick Crane Serv., Inc. v. OSHRC, 521 F.2d 628 (10th Cir. 1975); Sage v. Wein-
berger, No. 74-1775 (10th Cir., Aug. 12, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication); Lowry v.
Richardson, No. 74-1081 (10th Cir., June 2, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication); Thiret
v. FTC, 512 F.2d 176 (10th Cir. 1975); Mandrell v. Weinberger, 511 F.2d 1102 (10th Cir.
1975); Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 511 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1975);
Coddens v. Weinberger, 505 F.2d 795 (10th Cir. 1974).
1 Thiret v. FTC, 512 F.2d 176 (10th Cir. 1975); Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. v.
Secretary of Labor, 511 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1975).
No. 74-1676 (10th Cir., Aug. 8, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction requires a complainant in court first
to seek relief in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be sup-
plied by the courts even though the matter is properly presented to the court
in a matter within its jurisdiction.
2 AM. JUR. 2d Administrative Law § 788 (1962). The reasons frequently cited by courts
for this deferral are related to agency expertise, availability of informed investigative
agents, and the need for uniformity in ruling. See generally Pennsylvania R.R. v. Day,
360 U.S. 548 (1959); Federal Maritime Bd. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481 (1958); United
States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59 (1956).
507 F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1974).
" The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that where
a remedy before an administrative agency is provided, relief must be sought
by exhausting this remedy before courts will act.
2 AM. Jun. 2d Administrative Law § 595 (1962). Exhaustion of remedies is analogous, in
some respects, to the constitutional law principle of ripeness, in that it prevents judicial
review until the matter has been finally decided by the agency and a complete record
which will provide the basis for review has been compiled.
11 507 F.2d at 769.
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Similarly, in C. F. & I. Steel Corp. v. Morton 4 the court refused
judicial review of the correctness of a withdrawal order"5 where
the steel company had failed to seek administrative review of the
order.
Lack of jurisdiction based on res judicata determined
Neighbors v. Secretary of HEW. 1 There, Neighbors filed an ap-
plication for disability benefits substantially similar to one filed
earlier but disallowed. No appeal from the first decision had been
filed; the court would not review that decision under the guise of
reviewing the second application.
Judicial review of agency decisions may be sought where
there are alleged inconsistencies between decisions made by two
agencies empowered to make determinations in overlapping fields
of law. In two cases decided by the Tenth Circuit during 1975,' 7
decisions made by HEW were attacked. Appellants argued that
HEW's interpretation of words in its organic statute" should be
controlled by an interpretation of the same words previously
made by another agency. In both cases the court upheld HEW's
"inconsistent" interpretation of the contested phrase or word.
A similar question was presented in Cooley v. Weinberger.'"
There the court was asked to decide what effect, if any, should
be given by the Social Security Commission to a conviction for
murder imposed by an Iranian court. The Commission's regula-
tions preclude a convicted felon from receiving any benefits which
would ordinarily accrue to the surviving spouse of one covered by
Social Security.20 The court, in upholding the Commission's
" 516 F.2d 868 (10th Cir. 1975).
'5 A withdrawal order may be issued if the Interior Department finds that an "immi-
nent danger" exists in a coal mine. All persons are ordered withdrawn from the mine and
prohibited from entering. 30 U.S.C. § 814(a) (1970).
" 511 F.2d 80 (10th Cir. 1974). For a detailed discussion of res judicata as applied to
administrative agencies, see generally Comment, Administrative Law-Res Judi-
cata-Application of Res Judicata to Administrative Agencies with Parallel Jurisdiction,
Umberfield v. School District 11, 522 P.2d 730 (Colo. 1974), 52 DENVER L.J. 595 (1975).
" New Mexico v. Weinberger, 517 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1975); Mandrell v. Weinberger,
511 F.2d 1102 (10th Cir. 1975).
1 In Mandrell the dispute involved HEW's refusal to award the appellant full disabil-
ity benefits despite a determination by the Veterans Administration that he was "totally
disabled." In New Mexico the issue was whether the term "wages," as defined and used
by the IRS, should control a determination under the Social Security Act.
518 F.2d 1151 (10th Cir. 1975).
20 C.F.R. § 404.364 (1971).
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rejection of Doris Cooley's constitutional attacks on the Iranian
judgment, held that, since there was substantial evidence in the
record to support the AL's and Commission's findings, the claim
must be denied.2 It noted that the statute under which she was
convicted and the manner in which her trial was held were suffi-
ciently similar to the proceedings contemplated by the drafters
of this regulation to justify the decision to withhold benefits.2
An agency's interpretation of its own organic statute3 or its
internal operating rules and regulations24 may also provide a basis
for seeking judicial review. Five cases seeking review of determi-
nations by the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commis-
sion (OSHRC) were considered by the court during this term..2 1
Each of these related to a disputed interpretation by OSHRC of
its organic statute as applied to the appellant. In three of the
cases the court found the agency's interpretation controlling.'6 In
Brennan v. OSHR C,21 however, the court held that OSHRC's
interpretation of a time limitation established by a regulation
authorized by its statute,28 if upheld, would defeat the public
policy reflected in adoption of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act (OSHA). It overruled the Commission and held in
favor of the interpretation of the Secretary of Labor.
2518 F.2d at 1155.
22 But see Lennon v. INS, No. 74-2189 (2d Cir., Oct. 7, 1975). The Second Circuit
looked at the standards required for conviction under British law and found that they were
inconsistent with historic precedent in the United States which requires that liability be
predicated upon some knowledge. British law does not, according to the court, require that
the defendant possess "guilty knowledge" to be found guilty of possession of marijuana.
Thus, according to their interpretation, the Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(23) (1970), does not, per se, bar a grant of permanent residency status to one so
convicted.
22 C.F. & I. Steel Corp. v. Morton, 516 F.2d 868 (10th Cir. 1975); Brennan v. OSHRC,
513 F.2d 553 (10th Cir. 1975); Tennyson v. Gas Serv. Co., 506 F.2d 1135 (10th Cir. 1974);
Brennan v. OSHRC, 505 F.2d 869 (10th Cir. 1974).
24 Hall v. Fry, 509 F.2d 1105 (10th Cir. 1975).
22 Frohlick Crane Serv., Inc. v. OSHRC, 521 F.2d 628 (10th Cir. 1975); Transcon Lines
v. OSHRC, No. 74-1413 (10th Cir., April 16, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication); Brennan
v. OSHRC, 513 F.2d 553 (10th Cir. 1975); Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. v. Secretary of
Labor, 511 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1975); Brennan v. OSHRC, 505 F.2d 869 (10th Cir. 1974).
2 Frohlick Crane Serv., Inc. v. OSHRC, 521 F.2d 628 (10th Cir. 1975); Transcon Lines
v. OSHRC, No. 74-1413 (10th Cir., April 16, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication); Lee Way
Motor Freight, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 511 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1975).
27 513 F.2d 553 (10th Cir. 1975).
24 29 U.S.C. § 658(a) (1970). The regulation passed pursuant to this authorization set
the time for abatement at 15 days. 29 C.F.R. § 1903.14a (1975).
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In another case, also entitled Brennan v. OSHRC,2' the court
overruled a determination by the Commission that a standard,
enacted by the Secretary of Labor, was unenforceably vague.
The court noted that the case was an example of the continuing
conflict between the Secretary of Labor and OSHRC over their
respective roles in implementing the policy behind OSHA.3' It
found that, in the context in which the regulation was to be
applied, the term "near proximity" was not so vague that it could
not be applied to further the objective of the statute.
CONCLUSION
Although several of the cases decided by the Tenth Circuit
this year were interesting from a factual standpoint," no unusual
interpretations of administrative law were made. The court con-
sistently restricted its scope of review to that required by statute,
and only rarely did it find that an agency did not measure up to
the statutory standard. By limiting its interference with the
''agency process," the court furthers the basic principles which
justify the existence of administrative agencies.
Sandy Gail Nyholm
THE TENTH CIRCUIT VIEW OF TITLE VII DISCOVERY
EEOC v. University of New Mexico, 504 F.2d 1296
(10th Cir. 1974); Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp.,
522 F.2d 333 (10th Cir. 1975)
INTRODUCTION
Through Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the Act),'
Congress created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC), authorized to "prevent any person from engaging
in any unlawful employment practice" and empowered "to elimi-
29 505 F.2d 869 (10th Cir. 1974).
-" The court, citing the Act, held that its purpose is "to assure so far as possible every
working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions." 29 U.S.C.
§ 651(b) (1970).
" Gaspar v. Burton, 513 F.2d 843 (10th Cir. 1975), involved a constitutional challenge
to the procedure utilized in dismissing the appellant from a publicly funded vocational
school. For a discussion of Cooley v. Weinberger, see text accompanying notes 19-22 supra.
For a discussion of Salone v. United States, see text accompanying notes 4-6 supra.
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to -15 (1970).
1976
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nate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal
methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion." 2 A series of
political compromises, first by the House Judiciary Committee
and then by the Senate,3 left the EEOC with no enforcement
power of its own except the relatively inadequate ability to seek
judicial aid in securing obedience to EEOC investigatory de-
mands.4
The EEOC was created at a time of increasing public interest
in eliminating employment discrimination. The EEOC's relative
lack of power, coupled with this pressure to eliminate employ-
ment discrimination, meant that the EEOC's effectiveness de-
pended upon its power of investigation and the public exposure
gained through recourse to the judicial system. In such an atmos-
phere, courts generally enforced EEOC demands for information,5
the rationale being that
"it would be incongruous for Congress to create an administrative
agency to function in a new sensitive and socially and economically
important field", and at the same time curtail the agency's func-
tions in investigation and persuasion.'
In 1972 the Act was amended to enable the EEOC to initiate
civil actions in its own name in cases in which it was unable to
secure voluntary compliance.7 Although this amendment added
a powerful remedy, the EEOC still lacked the administrative
power of other agencies, 8 so the necessity for a broad scope of
discovery remained. Furthermore, a liberal interpretation of
EEOC discovery provisions, especially in the case of an EEOC-
instituted Title VII suit, would render them comparable to the
2 Id. § 2000e-5(a).
See generally Developments, Employment Discrimination and Title 1I of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1109 (1971). The House Judiciary Committee took
away the EEOC's power of enforcement and substituted the power to bring court actions
in its own name; the Senate then eliminated the power to bring court actions.
I See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(i), -9(b) (1970). The Attorny General also has the power
to bring a court action against a pattern or practice of discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-6 (1970).
See cases cited note 10 infra.
Sparton Southwest, Inc. v. EEOC, 461 F.2d 1055, 1059 (10th Cir. 1972), quoting
Local 104, Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 439 F.2d 237, 242 (9th Cir. 1971).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. II, 1972).
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-46 (1970), for the powers of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, which include the ability to hold hearings, issue cease and desist orders, obtain




discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.'
I. EARLY TENTH CIRCUIT CASES
In a series of cases decided since 1970, the Tenth Circuit has
outlined its position in regard to the permissible scope of EEOC
demands for information and, like other courts,' 0 has consistently
favored a broad scope to EEOC investigations of alleged Title VII
violations.
A. Sparton Southwest, Inc. v. EEOC, 461 F.2d 1055 (10th Cir.
1972)
In Sparton Southwest, Inc. v. EEOC"1 two corporations filed
petitions to set aside EEOC demands for the production of re-
cords, alleging that the charges filed by the EEOC were too gen-
eral and did not set forth the facts upon which they were based,
as required by section 2000e-5(a) of the Act. 2 The EEOC filed
cross-petitions for enforcement. In reversing the district court and
holding that the charges were sufficient to actuate the discovery
process, the Tenth Circuit discussed the discovery function of the
EEOC:
To require the charge to contain a specific bill of particulars would
necessarily limit the scope of the investigation to the particular
See FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
" See, e.g., the following cases which have upheld broad discovery in Title VII ac-
tions: Motorola v. McLain, 484 F.2d 1339 (7th Cir. 1973) (authority to require production
of relevant documents to be broadly construed); Parliament House Motor Hotel v. EEOC,
444 F.2d 1335 (5th Cir. 1971) (EEOC entitled to examine records on departments not
contained in charge); Graniteville Co. v. EEOC, 438 F.2d 32 (4th Cir. 1971) (no reasonable
cause prerequisite to enforcement of demand; EEOC investigatory powers at least as
broad as NLRB); Blue Bell Boots, Inc. v. EEOC, 418 F.2d 255 (6th Cir. 1969) (records on
other job classifications relevant); Manpower, Inc. v. EEOC, 346 F. Supp. 126 (D. Wis.
1972) (investigative powers extend to records of any person under investigation if relevant
to any unlawful employment practice); Chromcraft Corp. v. EEOC, 337 F. Supp. 653
(N.D. Miss. 1972) (no reasonable cause prerequisite to enforcement); Cameron Iron
Works, Inc. v. EEOC, 320 F. Supp. 1191 (S.D. Tex. 1970) (complaint by hourly employees
justified company-wide investigation); South Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 314 F. Supp.
349 (E.D. La. 1970) (scope of investigation not limited to period 90-180 days prior to filing
charge). But see General Ins. Co. of America v. EEOC, 491 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1974)
(demand reaching back 8 years unduly broad; discovery not extended to discrimination
not alleged); Georgia Power Co. v. EEOC, 295 F. Supp. 950 (W.D. Ga. 1968) (demand
does not compel compilation; demand limited to 5-year period prior to violation).
1 461 F.2d 1055 (10th Cir. 1972). This case was consolidated with United Nuclear-
Homestake Partners v. EEOC, since both involved identical issues.
2 The 1972 amendment to Title 42 renumbered this section to section 2000e-5(b) and
changed the requirement to read: "Charges shall ... contain such information and be in
such form as the Commission requires."
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
transaction or transactions meticulously described, and at the same
time would curtail the discovery mission of the Commission,
whereby the function Congress charged it to carry out would surely
fail. 11
In subsequent decisions in which the sufficiency of EEOC
charges was treated by the Tenth Circuit, 4 the court followed its
decision in Sparton. It found that charges which contained gen-
eral statements of alleged employment discrimination would sup-
port the EEOC's demands for information. 5
B. Joslin Dry Goods Co. v. EEOC, 483 F.2d 178 (10th Cir. 1973)
In a decision often cited for its effect on the scope of EEOC
investigatory demands, Joslin Dry Goods Co. v. EEOC,6 the
Tenth Circuit heard the allegation of an employee of Joslin's
downtown store that her termination was racially discriminatory.
As a part of its investigation, the EEOC requested information
on employees in all Joslin stores, including information on hiring
practices. 7 The district court had held, inter alia, that to supply
the requested information in regard to all of the Joslin stores
would be to require Joslin to compile information, a duty not
required by section 2000e-8 or section 2000e-9. 5 Additionally, it
held that the EEOC investigation could not extend to hiring prac-
tices, inasmuch as it could not be shown that the complainant
13 461 F.2d at 1060.
"* United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 477 F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1973); Mountain
States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 466 F.2d 541 (10th Cir. 1972); Adolph Coors Co. v. EEOC,
464 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 929 (1973).
" The charges in question generally followed 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970) in alleging
discriminatory failure and/or refusal to recruit and/or hire.
" 483 F.2d 178 (10th Cir. 1973).
" Id. at 180-81. In paragraph 5 of its subpoena, the EEOC demanded "[any like or
related records retained in a different form from the documents heretofore enumerated,
but reflective of the substance of the evidence in the DEMAND." Id. at 181. The Tenth
Circuit "suggested" that this demand was too broad and too vague to be enforceable. Id.
at 184.
" See the decision of the district court at 336 F. Supp. 941 (D. Colo. 1971). The Act
states that:
In connection with any investigation of a charge filed under Section 2000e-5
of this title, the Commission or its designated representative shall at all
reasonable times have access to, for the purposes of examination, and the
right to copy any evidence of any person being investigated or proceeded
against that relates to unlawful employment practices covered by this sub-
chapter and is relevant to the charge under investigation.
42 U.S.C. § 20O0e-8(a) (1970). The 1972 amendment, id. § 2000e-9 (Supp. II, 1972),
incorporates section 161 of Title 29, which provides, in part, for the issuance of a court
order requiring obedience to an administrative subpoena.
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was injured by these practices and, therefore, the requirement of
reasonable cause was not met.'9
The Tenth Circuit ruled that the EEOC could investigate
hiring and termination policies, but limited the EEOC's investi-
gation to the store where the complainant had been employed.0
In effect, then, this decision broadened the possible scope of
EEOC discovery in regard to discriminatory practices, but lim-
ited the scope geographically.
C. Circle K Corp. v. EEOC, 501 F.2d 1052 (10th Cir. 1974)
In Circle K Corp. v. EEOC,2 ' the Tenth Circuit further ex-
tended the scope of EEOC discovery. The charge in this case,
made by an unsuccessful job applicant, was of discrimination on
the basis of national origin. The EEOC wanted information on
company policy relating to polygraph testing; the company al-
leged that, since the complainant had not taken such a test, the
EEOC demand was not relevant and was too burdensome. The
EEOC appealed from the denial of enforcement, and the Tenth
Circuit reversed. In holding that the EEOC was entitled to this
information, the court determined that "[s]tanding may be up-
held absent any subjection to a discriminatory employment prac-
tice." 2 The Tenth Circuit also held that, if the charge is suffi-
cient and the information is relevant, the demand is proper and
enforceable, regardless of the potential burden to the employer.,,
The Tenth Circuit thereby extended the scope of EEOC discovery
to include discriminatory practices not mentioned in the original
charge, much as it had in Joslin. However, the Tenth Circuit was
more explicit in Circle K than it had been in Joslin when it
defined relevancy to include a suspected discriminatory practice
which may or may not have affected the complainant.24
" According to the Act:
If the Commission determines after such investigation that there is not rea-
sonable cause to believe that the charge is true, it shall dismiss the charge
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. I, 1972). Furthermore, "[tihe Commission shall make its
determination on reasonable cause as promptly as possible. Id. These requirements
relate solely to post-discovery actions by the EEOC.
20 483 F.2d at 184.
21 501 F.2d 1052 (10th Cir. 1974).
21 Id. at 1054.




Since the Circle K decision, the Tenth Circuit has attempted
to clarify and expand its position in regard to the scope of discov-
ery in Title VII actions in two cases, EEOC v. University of New
Mexico 25 and Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp.
2 8
II. EEOC v. University of New Mexico, 504 F.2d 1296 (10th Cir.
1974)
The Tenth Circuit's decision in EEOC v. University of New
Mexico2 17 is its most extensive statement to date regarding EEOC
discovery in Title VII actions. As articulated in this decision, the
policy of the Tenth Circuit is to give the broadest possible scope
to EEOC discovery, limited only by the indefinite requirements
of: (1) Lawful purpose, (2) relevancy, and (3) precise description.
A. Case Facts and History
The case involved an appeal taken by the University of New
Mexico from an order of the district court which required compli-
ance with an EEOC subpoena duces tecum. The complainant,
Dr. Jovan Djuric, an associate professor in the Department of
Electrical Engineering, charged that the University had termi-
nated him because of his national origin .2 The University sup-
plied the EEOC with, among other things, Djuric's personnel file
and copies of documents relating to employees terminated for the
same reason as Djuric. 9 The EEOC subpoena requested copies of
personnel files of faculty then employed by the department and
copies of personnel files of terminated employees for a period of
time which was longer than that covered by the information the
University had provided. 0
25 504 F.2d 1296 (10th Cir. 1974).
2S 522 F.2d 333 (10th Cir. 1975).
- 504 F.2d 1296 (10th Cir. 1974).
2 Djuric's original complaint, filed with the New Mexico Human Rights Commission,
was based on discrimination in salary and promotion since 1966 because of national origin
(Yugoslav) and religious creed. The New Mexico Commission dismissed the complaint.
Subsequently, Djuric was terminated and filed a charge with the EEOC alleging discrimi-
nation because of national origin. The Tenth Circuit found that none of the causes of
termination, as set forth in a memorandum from the Chairman of the Engineering Depart-
ment to Djuric, was related to ancestry, national origin, or religious creed. See 504 F.2d
at 1299.
" The University also produced information relating to terminations within the Engi-
neering Department between September 1970 and the time of the action, and minutes of
meetings of the Engineering Department at which Djuric's termination was discussed.
3' The subpoena issued by the EEOC requested additional information, specifically,
copies of personnel files of College of Engineering faculty who were terminated between
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The University refused to comply with the subpoena. The
EEOC contended that the information sought was necessary to
the investigation, arguing that, if faculty members with similar
jobs and similar performance records were not similarly treated,
then Djuric's termination was not related to job performance.
B. Scope of Discovery
The Tenth Circuit's opinion in this case was concerned solely
with the scope of EEOC investigation, and the policy statement
it made appeared early in the decision:
The sole limitation imposed upon the discovery procedures of the
EEOC in the conduct of investigations triggered by charges filed
under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 is whether the information sought is
"relevant" to or "relates to any matter" under investigation or in
question. '
1. Relevancy
The main argument propounded by the University was that
the EEOC subpoena was not relevant and was overbroad.3 2 Sec-
tion 2000e-8(a) of the Act gives broad investigatory powers to the
EEOC, limited only in that the information must be relevant to
investigation of a charge.Y In its decision, the court made it clear
that the investigation must be initiated by a Title VII charge of
employment discrimination. Thereafter, the scope of EEOC dis-
covery is virtually unlimited, because "relevancy" is defined in
terms of what is under investigation or in question. Such a broad,
circuitous definition does little to clarify the Tenth Circuit's posi-
January 1970 and May 14, 1973 (an extension of 9 months over the time period covered
by the information the University provided) and copies of all personnel files of College of
Engineering faculty as of May 14, 1973 (rather than lists of relevant information which
the University provided).
31 504 F.2d at 1301, citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a) (1970) and 29 U.S.C. § 161(1) (1970).
This statement by the Tenth Circuit paraphrased one made in Cudahy Packing Co. v.
NLRB, 117 F.2d 692 (10th Cir. 1941):
The only limitation upon the power of the Board to compel the production
of documentary or oral evidence is that it must relate to or touch the matter
under investigation or in question. The Board may not go beyond this limita-
tion and pry into the affairs of a business concern generally.
Id. at 694.
31 See 504 F.2d at 1298-99. The University argued that the EEOC had already ob-
tained documents showing that Djuric's termination was for poor job performance. These
documents included all memoranda to Djuric regarding poor job performance, including
one signed by all of the other faculty in the department and several from the head of the
department.
I See note 18 supra.
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tion, except perhaps to indicate that the court does not intend to
be bound by a restrictive definition.34
2. Subpoenas
In answer to the University's request for modification of the
subpoena, the Tenth Circuit discussed standards which must be
met by an administrative subpoena. Essentially, the information
sought is to be as precisely described as feasible, but "cannot be
so broadly stated as to constitute a 'fishing expedition.' ",35 How-
ever, the Tenth Circuit explained later, "administrative 'fishing
expeditions' are often permitted," and this requirement will be
"entitled to a flexible interpretation" analagous to that given the
statements in an EEOC charge .3 The Tenth Circuit, in fact, did
not define the scope of investigation, but added an elusive proce-
dural requirement. By not requiring a precise description of the
information requested from faculty personnel files, the Tenth Cir-
cuit impliedly rejected the University's arguments that the sub-
poena, as unmodified, would lead to public disclosure of confi-
dential information and a violation of fourth amendment rights.
37
3. Time Period
The argument by the University that some of the information
related to faculty personnel files and events prior to the 1972
amendment to the Act was given summary treatment by the
court. The Tenth Circuit stated that "while Title VII speaks to
the future, it necessarily embraces a backward glance in order to
11 In the Tenth Circuit's previous cases which concerned the scope of discovery, it
briefly, albeit unsatisfactorily, defined "relevancy." In Circle K Corp. v. EEOC, 501 F.2d
1052 (10th Cir. 1974), the court stated:
The charge is sufficient to state the unlawful practice to be investigated, and
the information sought is relevant to the EEOC investigation; therefore the
Demand is proper.
Id. at 1055. In Joslin Dry Goods Co. v. EEOC, 483 F.2d 178 (10th Cir. 1973), the court
noted that the question was more one of relevance than of standing: "The factual state-
ment of a wrongful discharge is enough to justify an investigation of employment practices
and policies, as to hiring as well as to firing." Id. at 184.
504 F.2d at 1301-02.
3, Id. at 1303-04. In support of its position that the requirement of specificity
will be flexibly interpreted, the Tenth Circuit analogized from previous cases construing
the sufficiency of charges filed by lay complainants or the EEOC: United States Steel
Corp. v. EEOC, 477 F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1973); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. EEOC,
466 F.2d 541 (10th Cir. 1972); Adolph Coors Co. v. EEOC, 464 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 929 (1973).
" The Tenth Circuit noted that the faculty were protected from public disclosure of




determine whether present employment practices are perpetuat-
ing past discriminations."38
4. Probable Cause
The University had also argued that, since the EEOC al-
ready possessed sufficient information to show that Djuric was
terminated for poor job performance, the EEOC had no probable
cause to believe there had been discrimination. In response to this
argument, the Tenth Circuit cited cases dealing with other ad-
ministrative agencies to support its holding that an administra-




The University argued hypothetically that, even if the inves-
tigation proceeded to its conclusion and the EEOC found that
Djuric was lawfully terminated and that other faculty with
equally poor job performances had not been terminated, Djuric
would not be rehired. To answer this argument, the Tenth Circuit
adopted the EEOC's position that comparative data is necessary
and reiterated its liberal policy in regard to discovery. 0 The court
noted: "[Tihe 'broad sweep' of the Act dictates that such an
inquiry may be pursued. In any event, no relief or remedy can be
effected under the Act until the investigation is concluded. '"'
This policy statement followed the Tenth Circuit's earlier
decisions and gave a broad scope to EEOC discovery. However,
the decision in EEOC v. University of New Mexico went further
than previous cases, stating that discovery will not be limited by
11 504 F.2d at 1304. In support of this proposition, the Tenth Circuit cited previous
cases in which the scope of discovery extended backwards in time: Joslin Dry Goods Co.
v. EEOC, 483 F.2d 178 (10th Cir. 1974) (hiring and termination practices included in
scope); Local 104, Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 439 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1971) (access to
information not limited to effective date of the Act); Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight,
Inc., 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970) (transfer policy discriminatory as to employees hired
prior to effective date of Act); Georgia Power Co. v. EEOC, 412 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1969)
(5-year period of investigation prior to alleged discrimination not overbroad for discovery,
although 8-year period was overbroad. See note 10 supra.)
" United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964) (IRS); United States v. Morton Salt
Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1949) (FTC); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186
(1945) (Wage and Hour Administration). The Joslin decision also touched upon reasona-
ble cause. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
'* The Tenth Circuit reaffirmed the necessity for finding out whether "presumptively
valid reasons for his rejection were in fact a coverup for a racially discriminatory decision."
504 F.2d at 1306, quoting McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973).
1 504 F.2d at 1305.
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requirements of probable cause, availability of redress, confiden-
tiality, or procedure.
III. Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333 (10th Cir. 1975)
In its most recent decision relating to scope of discovery in
Title VII actions, Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp. ,42 the Tenth
Circuit appeared to be less concerned with overall policy. This
may have been due, in part, to its extensive statements in the
EEOC v. University of New Mexico decision. However, because
of its concern for the particular fact situation before it, the Tenth
Circuit did clarify and expand its position in several significant
areas.
A. Case Facts and History
The action was originally a rule 23 class action brought by
seven employees4" of Martin Marietta's Waterton plant who al-
leged discrimination in promotion on behalf of all females, Ne-
groes, and Hispano-Americans who were employed or might be
employed at the plant. The district court effectively defeated the
class action aspect of the case by its definition of the classes,
sustained the defendant's objection to the plaintiffs' interrogato-
ries, and dismissed the matter because of the failure of the plain-
tiffs to prove a prima facie case."
The plaintiffs' requests for discovery depended upon their
definition of the plaintiff class. The district court reduced the
class to 40 employees,45 and held that the plaintiffs were to limit
their interrogatories to requests for information regarding em-
12 522 F.2d 333 (10th Cir. 1975).
13 Jewel Rich, Thomas Franklin, Lawrence Collier, John Craig, John Langley and
Bobby Chappell were blacks. Jose Tafoya was an Hispano-American.
11 The district court held that: Rich and Franklin were promoted according to ability
and qualifications; Langley,Collier, Craig, and Chappell failed to show that they were
qualified for higher positions; and Tafoya failed to meet the criteria set forth in McDonnell
Douglas which required the complainant to show: (1) That he was a member of a racial
minority, (2) who applied and qualified for the job, but (3) was rejected despite his
qualifications, and (4) that the position remained open and the employer sought other
applicants. See 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). However, the Tenth Circuit made it clear that
these criteria are not to be used as an approach to all Title VII cases. See 522 F.2d at 346-
47.
'3 The district court limited the class to those 40 persons in precisely the same em-
ployment situations as the plaintiffs. As a consequence, the class was limited to female




ployees of Martin Marietta who could be specifically named."
The Tenth Circuit overturned the decision limiting the class as
"contrary to the decisions of the Supreme Court and other federal
courts."4 The court then discussed the scope of discovery in the
revised class, where the class would include all employees of the
Waterton plant who were discriminated against as a result of the
company's policies.
B. Scope of Discovery
1. Relevancy
The defendant had successfully argued at the district court
level that the compilation of plant-wide statistics requested in
plaintiffs' interrogatories would be too burdensome and expen-
sive. The Tenth Circuit responded to the company's argument
with a summary of its previous decisions in regard to the scope
of EEOC discovery, and concluded that "[ilt cannot be said...
that the policy of this court has been to narrowly circumscribe
discovery in EEOC cases."4 The court noted that the broad scope
given to EEOC discovery under Title VII is necessary, and espe-
cially where
immediate evidence and circumstances pertaining to the plaintiffs
are not sufficient to constitute a prima facie case, plant-wide statis-
tics and department statistics are of the highest relevance."
This statement by the Tenth Circuit is reminiscent of the
argument of plaintiff in EEOC v. University of New Mexico that
11 Through interrogatories, plaintiffs had requested information regarding the entire
Waterton plant, including information on hiring and promotion policies. After the class
was limited to four subgroups, the defendant objected that plant-wide statistics were no
longer relevant, and the district court sustained this objection. The plaintiffs, therefore,
were limited to statistical information already obtained from defenddnt showing promo-
tions of minorities and the reports that defendant had filed with the EEOC. The Tenth
Circuit noted that the reports required by the EEOC were not probative of defendant's
promotion policies.
', 522 F.2d at 340.
A' Id. at 344.
'Id. at 345. The Tenth Circuit's concern for the case as it will be tried on remand
apparently stems from what it felt to be the inequities of the trial at the district court
level. For example, the Tenth Circuit noted:
[lit was grossly unjust to allow the defendant company to utilize plant-wide
statistics involving large classes of people, plus statistics of other employers
in this five-county area, while at the same time restricting the plaintiffs to
the narrowest possible scope.
Id. at 343. See also note 50 infra.
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comparative data is needed,50 inasmuch as it "very likely would
prove crucial to the establishing or failure to establish a prima
facie case"'" and would be relevant to rebut any argument by
defendant of business necessity.,
Having already discussed the relevancy standard in EEOC
v. University of New Mexico, the Tenth Circuit did not accord it
further treatment, except tangentially in relation to the balanc-
ing test discussed below. However, it is clear from the decision
that "defendant's hiring, promotion and lay-off practices within
individual departments on a plant-wide level ' 53 were all relevant,
notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff's complaint dealt only
with discrimination in promotion. The Tenth Circuit's position in
Martin Marietta was a logical application of its previous deci-
sions. 4
2. Private Actions
Perhaps one of the most important aspects of the opinion is
the Tenth Circuit's application of the policies, standards, and
requirements developed in EEOC-initiated actions to private ac-
tions under Title VII. The Tenth Circuit made it clear that, since
the elimination of employment discrimination is the objective of
1' In the Martin Marietta case, comparative data would be needed to determine the
meaning of "qualified" as it related to white, male employees and the plant-wide layoff
and promotion procedure.
S1 522 F.2d at 344. The Tenth Circuit devoted approximately one-fourth of its opinion
to the issue of the establishment of a prima facie case. The Tenth Circuit noted that the
district court's ruling that plaintiffs had failed to establish a prima facie case largely
depended upon a showing by defendant resulting from the use of statistics covering the
years 1966 to 1973. In the Tenth Circuit's view this period was excessive, inasmuch as the
EEOC complaint was filed in 1969 and much of the improvement in employment practices
on the part of the defendant occurred between 1969 and 1973. Id. at 346. Additionally,
the Tenth Circuit noted that the statistical information which Martin Marietta did pro-
vide the plaintiffs was not responsive to the issues, in that these statistics included Orien-
tals and American Indians in the classification of minorities; and, since Orientals were
heavily represented in the upper management, the statistics in regard to blacks, females
and Hispano-Americans were distorted.
52 In using the word "relevant" in regard to rebutting defendant's business necessity
argument, the Tenth Circuit defined it as "necessity." Previously it had defined "rele-
vancy" in connection with scope of investigations, but here the Tenth Circuit defined the
term in connection with proof of the case.
5 522 F.2d at 343.
5, EEOC v. University of New Mexico, 504 F.2d 1296 (10th Cir. 1974) (extended scope
to include personnel files of others); Circle K Corp. v. EEOC, 501 F.2d 1052 (10th Cir.
1974) (extended scope to test not required of complainant); Joslin Dry Goods Co. v.




both the EEOC and private court actions, "information relevant
in an EEOC inquiry is equally relevant in a private action."55 The
Tenth Circuit applied its policy in regard to the requirements and
limits of discovery expressed in previous cases to Title VIIactions
brought by private individuals.
3. Balancing Test
As to the scope of plaintiffs' interrogatories regarding plant-
wide policies, the Tenth Circuit stated:
It is plain that the scope of discovery through interrogatories
and requests for production of documents is limited only by relev-
ance and burdensomeness and in an EEOC case the discovery scope
is extensive. This is a factor which the court should balance on the
benefit side as against the burden of the defendant in answering the
interrogatories."'
In addressing itself to the question of the burden to the answering
party, the Tenth Circuit added another qualification to those set
out in EEOC v. University of New Mexico and considered a re-
striction it had only summarily treated in Circle K.17
The court retreated from its inflexible position in Circle K by
stating that a balancing test is involved. The burden to the defen-
dant is to be weighed against the circumstantial nature of the
evidence, the inability of the plaintiffs to obtain the information
elsewhere, its importance to the establishment of a prima facie
case, and its usefulness in rebutting a "business necessity" de-
fense.5 In the case of Martin Marietta, the Tenth Circuit noted
that the figures were, in all probability, already isolated and com-
puted. Hence, this relatively insignificant burden to the defen-
dant was to be balanced against the relevancy (or necessity) to
the plaintiffs' case.
4. Compilation
Perhaps most important from a practical standpoint is the
Tenth Circuit's position regarding the compilation of requested
information. The Act itself requires only that the EEOC have
access to evidence and the right to copy. 9 The district court's
5 522 F.2d at 344.
Id. at 343.
s The. Tenth Circuit had said in Circle K Corp. v. EEOC, 501 F.2d 1052 (10th Cir.
1974): "Nor can enforcement of the demand be defeated on Circle K's allegation that
compliance would be unduly burdensome." Id. at 1055.
:A 522 F.2d at 345.
' See note 18 supra.
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holding in Joslin, untouched by the Tenth Circuit, was that
"[tlhere is no way that the statute can be read to require an
employer to compile information.""0 This is consistent with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' The Tenth Circuit in Martin
Marietta initially took an equivocal position by stating "it is not
at all clear that a general invitation to inspect records satisfies
the defendant's obligations under the discovery rules."" It later
suggested, however, that Martin Marietta "ought to proceed
forthwith with compiling [the statistics] or at least compiling




In both EEOC v. University of New Mexico and Martin
Marietta, the Tenth Circuit continued the trend, begun in earlier
Title VII cases,6" of giving a liberal interpretation to the scope of
discovery. In these decisions, however, the Tenth Circuit began
to speak more particularly of the factors to be considered in act-
ing on motions to compel discovery, defining them in such a way
that they do not restrict discovery. In EEOC v. University of New
Mexico the requirements of relevancy, lawful purpose, precision,
protection of confidentiality, and probable cause are defined so
that they do not limit discovery. Similarly, in Martin Marietta
the requirement of relevancy is broadly defined, and the burden
on the answering party is balanced against the necessity of the
information to the case. The Tenth Circuit moved in these cases
to define more clearly the scope of discovery in Title VII actions,
without limiting that scope.
Kristine A. Hoeltgen
60 Joslin Dry Goods Co. v. EEOC, 483 F.2d 178 (10th Cir. 1973), quoting the district
court, 336 F. Supp. 941, 947 (D. Colo. 1971).
" See FED. R. Cirv. P. 33.
62 522 F.2d at 343 n.5.
Id. at 345.
, See text accompanying notes 11-24 supra.
VOL. 53
